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wO SUMMERS ago,

VAN ALSTYNE*

the Centre of the Hague Academy of Interna-

tional Law devoted its faculty seminar to the study of international river law. Drawn from eastern and western nations and
divided into French and English speaking sections, the thirty participants prepared papers for presentation and critical discussion on
various subtopics. The scholarship and the intensity of the seminars
were gravely impressive. At nearly every turn, however, the discussions foundered on two points: first, disagreement on whether
there are sources of international law which tend to establish legal
principles applicable by a neutral tribunal to the type of problem
being considered-a disagreement which riddled and ventilated
nearly every session; second, the generality of the substantive law
principles offered by each reporter as applicable to his given subjecta generality so uncircumscribed as to leave the probable result of
any given hypothetical case almost wholly unpredictable.
The application of international law to non-navigational uses of
international rivers has a very substantial bibliography: dozens of
treaties dating back four centuries, a substantial number of decided
cases, parallel municipal law practices, and an abundance of treatises
by highly qualified publicists. These should provide ample bases
for outlining the law of international rivers in a useful, predictive
fashion. The international law rule which commands a consensus
is the same rule which the Supreme Court of the United States will
apply in apportioning the economic use of interstate rivers when
there is no overriding federal statute or congressionally approved interstate compact'-the rule of equitable apportionment. The con" A.B. 1955, University of Southern California; LL.B. 1958, Stanford University.
Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University School of Law; Visiting Associate
Professor of Law at Duke University, spring semester 1964.
' Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 562, 565 (1963); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589 (1945); Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
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tent of this rule is clear enough to render future disputes over
international rivers fully justiciable: a neutral tribunal would have
reasonably clear legal guidelines to employ in the adjudicatory
process and the litigating nations would not be involved in reckless
gambling by submitting to a tribunal committed to these guidelines.
This conclusion is, however, at variance with the considered
opinion of some very excellent writers,2 including professors Berber
and Smith who have contributed the most lengthy treatises on the
subject. In a fairly recent recapitulation of materials which a
tribunal might employ under article 38 of the statute for the International Court of Justice, Professor Berber discouragingly concluded: "It is noteworthy that water disputes are generally agreed
to constitute a classical example of disputes which cannot be satisfactorily solved by judicial decision."3 Twenty years after completing
the first definitive text on the subject,4 Professor Smith was even less
confident that the judicial process was equal to the task than he was
in 1931:
[R]eference to a court is obviously little more than a gamble unless there
are clear and accepted rules of law which the court can apply to the facts
before it, and in this matter of international water rights it is unfortuU.S. 419 (1922). For a complete bibliography of American interstate water cases,
see The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV.
665, 708-18 (1959).
2BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 204 (5th ed. 1955); id. at 126 (1st ed. 1928);
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 218 (3d ed. 1957); De Visscher, Thdories et
Rgalitds en Droit InternationalPublic 260-65 (2d ed. 1955); Eagleton, The Use of the
Waters of International Rivers, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1018 (1955); MacKay, The International Joint Commission Between the United States and Canada, 22 Am. J. INT'L L.
292, 295 (1928). See also BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 388 (1962); BPiERLY, THE
OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-43 (1944); 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (2d
rev. ed. 1947); KAECKENBEECK, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 181 (1918); SIMSARIAN, THE
DIVERSION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS 99 (1939); Legal Aspects of Hydro-Electric
Development of Rivers and Lakes of Common Interest, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC COMMISsION FOR EUROPE, U.N. Doc. No. E/ECE/136, at 85 (1952) [hereinafter cited ECE REPORT]; Report of the Nile Commission, 130 BRISH & FOREIGN STATE
PAPERS 112 (1929) [hereinafter cited as BRIT.ST.P.]; Austin, Canadian-United States
Practice and Theory Respecting the International Law of International Rivers: A
Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. B. REV. 393, 399
(1959); Goldie, InternationalLaw and the Development of International River Basins
1 U. BRIT. COLUm. L. REv. 763 (1963); Murphy, The Function of International Law
in the InternationalCommunity: The Columbia River Dispute, 1961 MILITARY L. REV.
181.
3
BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (1959); Berber, The Indus Water
Dispute, 6 INDIAN YB. INT'L AFF. 46, 60 (1957). See also Scott, Kansas v. Colorado
Revisited, 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 432, 454 (1958); The Problem of the Indus and1 Its
Tributaries:An Alternative View, THE WoRLD TODAY 266, 274-75 (1958).
'SMTH,

THE ECONOMIC USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS

87, 154 (1931).
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nately true that the law of nations has so far signally failed to keep pace
with modern developments. 5
There is, however, more in common between these writers and
some participants in the Hague seminar than erudition and mutual
discouragement for the lack of an explicit international law on this
subject. The treatment of the subject has suffered from an approach
largely given to an effort to deduce a single clear rule from a catalogue of authority. Since the doctrine of equitable apportionment
does not on its face appear to dictate the resolution of any given dispute, it is frequently denigrated as no doctrine at all but only a
general appeal to international conscience or to a decision ex aequo
et bono.6
The ex aequo clause,7 never yet employed by the International
Court, fundamentally rests on an agreement by the litigants to trust
to the good conscience of the court to decide according to its own
notions of fairness; if the principle of equitable apportionment fits
no other slot, Professor Smith is doubtless correct that an adjudication on such a basis would be a gamble.
Berber and Smith have tried to recover from the apparent dead
end of the law by suggesting that in the absence of clearly established
legal principles, riparian states should be encouraged to adjust their
differences by mutual agreements. 8 The suggestion is not, however,
incompatible with a bolder proposition that certain legal principles
do exist; indeed, the suggestion that disputes can be resolved without
reference to established principles may otherwise have unfortunate
consequences. If there are no general principles limiting the claim
of a state to all water flowing through its territory, then it would appear that no upper riparian would concede the legitimacy of a claim
made by any water-consuming lower riparian except under threat of
superior force or, if the balance of power were in its own favor, in
return for disproportionate benefits, e.g., receipt of undue compensation or an exorbitant share of the economic benefits. This is the

"Smith,

The Waters of the Jordan: A Problem of International Water Control, 25

INT'L AFF. 415, 420 (1949).
o BERBER,

SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

USES OF THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 5
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ON

THE

(1957); Andrassy, Kori;enje voda

prema rezoluciji, International Law Association u New Yorku, 9 ZBORNIK PROVNOY
FAKULTETA U ZAGREB 236 (1939); Smith, supra note 5, at 415.
7
STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 88, para. 2.
8For a brief discussion, see BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 266-67 (1959);
BERBER, op. cit. supra note 6, at 5.
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natural course of extralegal negotiations, in contrast with the course
of events where the negotiating position of each party is bottomed on
a conviction that an influential and neutral third party, whether it
be a court, an international bank, or a consensus of other states,
would accommodate their interests differently in accordance with
basic legal postulates.
An entirely separate development which would appear extraordinary indeed if there are really no emergent legal principles is the
argument that there exists a duty under international law to submit
water disputes to arbitration in the event that mutual agreement
cannot be reached. This "duty," described by John Laylin four
years ago,9 was enlarged upon recently in Laylin's report to the ILA
Committee on International Rivers, at The Hague. 10 Almost simultaneous with the last event was the adoption of a nearly identical
recommendation by the Institut de Droit International." This
duty, to arbitrate interests which appear irreconcilable by negotiation, purportedly results from the fact that most riparian states are
members of the United Nations and that they have renounced the
use of force as a means of settling international differences. 12 With
this limitation upon the power of the state which objects to a proposed use, the proposing riparian "cannot pursue a course of
unilateral action in derogation of the agreement by other parties to
the dispute to abstain from taking the law into their own hands."' 8
Thus, the proposing state may not proceed with its project if an
objection is made by a co-riparian, unless the objecting state is itself
unwilling to arbitrate. The objecting state may therefore delay the
proposed use "if it is willing to have the validity of its objection
tested by third-party determination."' 14
Support for this bilateral duty to arbitrate is found in a United
State Senate document which purports to set forth the State Department's understanding of principles of international law:
9Laylin

& Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in International River Disputes, 53

AM. J. INT'L L. 30 (1959).

10 Laylin, Report on the Rights and Duties of Parties to a Water Dispute Pending
Its Solution by Peaceful Means, Intl Law Ass'n Committee on the Uses of the Waters
of International Rivers, (Den Haag, Aug. 30, 1961) [hereinafter cited as Laylin Report].
11 Texte D~finitif de la Risolution tel qu'Adopt6 au Cours de la Seance, Sept. 11,
1961,1 2 arts. 6-8 reprinted in 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 737, 738 (1962).
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
13Laylin Report. See also Note, 55 Am.J. INT'L L. 645 (1961).
11Laylin & Bianchi, supra note 9, at 36-37.
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If the coriparian, in good faith, objects and demonstrates its willing-

ness to reach a prompt and just solution by the pacific means envisaged
in Article 38 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations, a riparian is under

a duty to refrain from making,
or allowing, such change, pending agree15
ment or other solution.

Mr. Laylin asserts that the duty to arbitrate is generally supported by treaty practice, and that at least sixty-six states have made
agreements of this type, affecting international rivers. 16 Two major river treaties executed within the last three years expressly bind
the signatories to compulsory arbitration, 17 although a third treaty,
affecting the Nile, contains no similar provision.' s
But the point here is not to prove or disprove the existence of a
legal duty to submit water disputes to arbitration in accordance
with general principles of international law. It is, rather, simply to
underscore the assumption implicit in any such duty, that there
necessarily exists some body of law for a court of arbitrationto apply! The duty to arbitrate is not confined by its proponents to
treaty signatories or to questions involving merely the interpretation of treaties which may supply their own law ad hoc. Rather, it
allegedly applies between riparians who have simply fallen into disagreement as to the right of one to make a particular use of a communal river. To stipulate that these parties must submit to an
arbitral decision based on international law surely assumes that
there is a sufficient body of law to make such a process useful; otherwise the duty to arbitrate comes to nothing, since the commission
would be obliged to dismiss the case for want of sufficient substantive
rules to adjudicate the dispute. The parties would thus be returned
to the same stalemate which the duty to arbitrate is designed to
avoid.
Neither do these agreements to submit to arbitration suggest that
the parties intend that the tribunal is to decide ex aequo et bonomore or less according to its own conscience. Such an uncharted
departure from legal protections of sovereign interest is not to be
lightly suggested. Thus, notwithstanding the diffidence of some, it
" Griffin, Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters, S. Doc. No.
118, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1958). See also Griffin, The Use of Waters of International
DrainageBasins Under Customary International Law, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 50, 79 (1959).
10 Laylin Report at 10.
1 See Columbia River Treaty, 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 234, 239 (1961); Indus Waters
Treaty, 123 WoPar Air. 99 (1960).
" See 13 MID. EAST J. 422 (1959).
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is evident that not every state or every author insists that disputes
involving the economic uses of international rivers are nonjusticiable
for lack of a sufficiently developed body of international law.
It is submitted that equitable apportionment is considerably
more of a legal doctrine than is sometimes supposed, and that it will
provide a justiciable basis for a wide variety of real international
disputes. The persuasiveness and clarity of the principle can be
made most apparent through its application to a representative series
of cases rather than through the more orthodox technique of drawing a chain of authority around the general proposition itself. In
what follows we shall be concerned with matured fact situations
setting forth concrete disputes between two or more nations traversed by a common river, where one of the nations proposes to
make some economic use of the river in a way which antagonizes
another riparian claimant. The cases are arranged to move from
the easier to the more difficult, the better to illustrate some aspect
of equitable apportionment.
CASE I

The Z River flows through states X and Y, X being the upper
riparian. X proposes to construct a dam along the Z River; the
dam will provide power for several domestic hydroelectric projects.
The water passing the dam will be returned to the Z river bed to
cross the border into Y in the same amount, at the same rate of
flow and, for all practical purposes, as though it had never been
involved in the project. Nevertheless, Y objects to the project and
asserts that its consent is indispensable as a condition precedent to
the use of the Z River by any other riparian. Y bases its objection
on a claim of absolute territorial integrity.
During the ensuing arbitration proceeding, Y enlarges upon its
objection by asserting the inviolability of prior consent as a customary rule of international fluvial law recognized by civilized states
and evidenced by a substantial number of treaties. Y points out, as
an example, that the Prussian-Netherlands Treaty of 1816 fixed
certain frontiers and provided: "[Neither State] shall make any
alteration whatever in the course of the rivers or in the actual banks
of the rivers, nor grant any concession or diversion of water, without
the consent and agreement of the two Governments." 19 A Finnish19 Trait6 de Limites entre Leurs Majests le Roi de Prusse et le Roi des Pays-Bas,
June 26, 1816, 3 BRIT.ST.P. 720, 729 (1815-1816).
(Author's translation; emphasis
added.)
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Russian Treaty of 1922 similarly provided that: "Waters may not
be diverted from the watercourses... unless a special agreement has
been concluded in each case between the Contracting States." 20
A Costa Rican-Panamanian Treaty of 1941 stipulated at article 5
that: "Any work either one of the two countries may desire to undertake on the rivers marking the frontier line must be approved,
in anticipation, by the other party." 21 And the ECE Report of 1952
recommended that: "Any work such as canalization, irrigation, or
the development of electrical power shall only be undertaken subject to the mutual consent of both riparian States. '22 Y also draws
from United Nations proceedings to quote the argument of the
Syrian delegate before the Security Council in 1953, in which he
insisted with regard to development of the Jordan River: "There is
no doubt whatever that in this case a mutual prior agreement for
the use of the waters is necessary before any project can be started
''
in connection with them."
This case is not entirely hypothetical, and while case decisions
lack the force of stare decisis in international law, it is clear that a
neutral tribunal would reject Y's position for the same reasons as
those employed by the Court of Arbitration in Affaire de Lac
Lanoux. 24

On stipulated facts that waters from Lake Lanoux flow-

ing into Spain would not be affected by French diversions from the
Carol River which fed the lake and which France sought to use in
a hydroelectric project wholly within French territory, the Arbitral
Court upheld the right of France to proceed without Spanish consent. It expressly rejected prior consent as a general principle or
customary rule of international law investing each riparian with an
absolute veto power. While the holding is necessarily cast in the
form of rejecting the Spanish proposition as a rule of law (because
of the manner in which the case arose procedurally), it virtually as20 Convention Between Finland and Russia Concerning the Maintenance of River
Channels and the Regulation of Fishing on Water Courses Forming Part of the
Frontier Between Finland and Russia, Oct. 28, 1922, 19 L.N.T.S. 193, 194-95 (1923).
21 Treaty Regarding Frontiers Between Costa Rica and Panama, May 1, 1941, 144
BRiu.ST.P. 751, 758 (1940-1941).
(Emphasis added.)
22 ECE REPORT 149
(Emphasis added), quoting from Exchange of Notes Between
the United Kingdom and Brazil, March 15, 1940, 5 U.N.T.S. 72 (1947).
23 U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. REc. 8th year, 649th Meeting (S/PV.649) 21 (1953).
(Emphasis added.)
2462 REVUE GtNgRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 79 (1958). Excerpts are
reprinted in 53 Am.J. INT'L L. 156 (1959).
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serts that a state may unilaterally develop harmless 2 uses of an
international river within its borders as a legitimate exercise of
sovereign interest. The decision appears to be equally useful
whether we are discussing harmless diversions for hydroelectric
projects, or harmless diversions for recreational purposes such as
fishing, boating, or swimming. Restated, the Lake Lanoux decision
holds for the following proposition: The right of territorial sovereignty over an international river entitles a riparian state to use
the river in any manner which will not result in a material alteration
of the river or of its availability for use as it passes through other
riparian states.
Y's position in our hypothetical case, like Spain's in the Lake
Lanoux arbitration, should be rejected as a matter of reason and
authority. First, it is arguable that notwithstanding the absolute
phraseology of the scattered treaty provisions assembled by Y, these
provisions were intended to apply only when a proposed use by one
riparian would result in a significant disadvantage to the other
signatory powers; harmless unilateral uses may not be within the
common obligation to secure prior consent. Second, even assuming
these provisions do confer an absolute veto power on each riparian,
they are contrary to a far greater number of treaties and practices
which limit the doctrine of prior consent to instances where substantial harm can be shown. 26 Consequently, they may simply
represent an ad hoc departure from what the signatory states otherwise understood would prevail as a matter of customary international
law in the absence of such a special agreement. 27 Finally, the special
25 It is correct, of course, that neighboring states whose use of the river is
physically unimpaired may still feel politically disadvantaged by the growth of power
which their riparian neighbor may realize from harnessing the river. Explicit in the
Lake Lanoux decision, however, is the proposition that pacific political advantage
resulting from an otherwise harmless use of an international river does not constitute
a legal injury.
-2 A
substantial number of these treaties, with supporting comments by highly
qualified international law publicists, are discussed in Case 11, infra.
27 "[Treaties] ... may go to show, according to the nature of the case and the
particular circumstances, the existence of general usage which the parties wished
to record for convenience in apt words and an authentic form (though this is not
common), or the dissatisfaction of the parties with existing usage and their desire
to improve on it, or the absence of any settled usage at all antecedent to the particular
agreement. It is, therefore, impracticable... to make any general statement as to
the value of treaties and similar instruments as evidence of the law of nations."
Pollack, The Sources of International Law, 2 COLUm. L. Rav. 511 (1902). See also
LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT

377-79 (1958).

Vol.1964: 307]

INTERNATIONAL RIVER DISPUTES

adoption of these veto-power provisions has never been accompanied
by any declaration that they were required by international law,
and thus the opinio juris condition is lacking to make them useful
as evidence of customary law under article 38 of the International
28
Court's statute.
As a matter of reason, it should be clear that each nation must
be free to develop fluvial resources which will advance its economy
or welfare when no substantial alteration of the river as it flows
from or into co-riparian states results. Any rule to the contrary
could operate to frustrate the useful application of a valuable natural
resource, according to political jealousies of states tempted to invoke
their veto power for unworthy reasons or for no reason at all-a
prospect wholly at odds with the principle of equitable apportion29

ment.

While the affirmative rule of customary international law deducible from the Lake Lanoux case is necessarily limited to simple
facts, it is a rule which does contribute to the justiciability of international river disputes and it makes clear that submission to a
tribunal under some circumstances will not be a gamble.
CASE II

State X, the upper riparian, proposes to construct its hydroelectric plant near the X-Y border. The acceleration of the flow
occasioned by the river passing through new sluices just on the X
side, will result in the quickened erosion of irrigation canals in the
upper part of Y. At a cost of $100,000 (less than 1% of the total
project cost), X could restore the river flow to its original rate of
movement through Y either by introducing certain concrete water
breaks into the river on its side of the border-thus promoting its
own development with no substantial injury to Y-or by removing
its proposed dam further up the river. X refuses to take either of
these measures, however, asserting that there is no rule of international law to proscribe its use of water within its territory according to its own inclination. To the contrary, it asserts that the
21 "We can therefore hold fast to the firmly established proposition that state
practice alone, even when frequently recurring and carried out over a long period, does
not constitute sufficient evidence of the existence of customary law, but that a

psychological element-often difficult to verify-must be present, namely, the conviction
of states that they are bound in law to the particular course of conduct." BERBER,
RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (1959); see authorities cited id. at 46-47. See also
FENWIcK, INTERNATIONAL LW 62-63 (1934); LAUTERPACHT, op cit. supra note 27, at
379; 1 OPPENREIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (8th ed. 1955); Tunkin, Remarks on the
Juridical Nature of Customary Norms of International Law, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 419,
422 (1961). But see discussion in text at notes 61-65 infra.
20See discussion in text at notes 98-112 infra.
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rule is that sovereign power over all water flowing through one's

territory is unlimited.
At the arbitration hearing, X supports its case by relying partly
on the "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists" that there
is no international law on point to restrict a state's exercise of its
sovereignty. 0 Additionally X draws upon the whole body of authority accompanying the Harmon doctrine, 31 viz., that a sovereign
may appropriate resources within its territory regardless of the conse32
quences to its neighbors, a rule seemingly acknowledged by Briggs
and Kluber, 33 and the alleged state practice of India as represented
34
by Mr. Sikri.
Even so, there is little doubt that an international court would
possess an authoritative basis for rejecting X's contention, and for
affirmatively sustaining the objection of Y. The principle finally
applicable to justiciable disputes of this kind is this: No state may
use the water of a communal river in a manner which substantially
and adversely affects other riparians where reasonable means exist
to secure the same use without adversely affecting the other riparians.

To establish this principle, the first step is to negative X's claim
based upon the Harmon doctrine, i.e., absolute territorial sovereignty as a matter of international law. This step has already been

taken by other writers.3 5 The following will do as a succinct
summary.
30 See

authorities cited note 2 supra.

1 HYDE, op. cit. supra note 2, at
565-72; SIMSARIAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 71; Austin, supra note 2, at 393; Murphy,
supra note 2, at 186-87.
32 "In the absence of [a special convention between States] ... national rivers
and those portions of international rivers which are within the national territory are
subject to the exclusive control of the territorial sovereign. No general principle of
international law prevents a riparian State from excluding foreign ships from the
navigation of such a river or from diverting or polluting its waters." Biucms, TiE
LAw OF NATIONS 274 (2d ed. 1952).
83 "A State ... is entitled to exploit its territory to achieve its proper objects.., by
... changing the course of waterways, even if that might turn out to be to the
detriment of other States." I KLUBER, EUROPAISCHES VOLKERRECHT 128 (1821), quoted
in ECE REPORT at 52. See Sikri, Principles of Law Governing the Uses of International
31 See BERBER, op. cit. supra note 28, at 14-19;

Rivers, 1956 REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAw ASSOCIATION CONFERENCE 8 [hereinafter cited as INT'L L. ASS'N CONF. REP.].
34India eventually relinquished the position in negotiations with Pakistan and

the World Bank concerning the Indus River basin.
3r BERBER, op. cit. supra note 28, at 19-40; Austin, supra note 2; Griffin, The Use
of Waters of International Drainage Basins Under Customary International Law, 53
AM. J. INT'L L. 50, 69 (1959); Johnson, Effect of Existing Uses on the Equitable Ap.
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The Harmon doctrine finds its basis in the mere opinion of an
United States Attorney General that the rights of America as the
upper riparian on the Rio Grande River were unlimited by any
effect the unbridled exercise of those rights might have on the flow of
the river into Mexico.36 The doctrine was expressly reserved in the
American-Mexican Treaty of 1906,37 and it continued to receive lip
service by the United States until 1939.38 It was expressly disclaimed
as a principle of municipal law in 1922 by the United States Supreme
Court, 30 however, and it has not been applied even during negotiations with Mexico, since 1944.4 0 Moreover, it is quite clear that
the "doctrine" was merely an instrument of foreign policy, not only
because it was never widely supported abroad but also because the
United States has assumed a radically different attitude when, as a
lower riparian on the Columbia River, application of the doctrine
would have operated to its distinct disadvantage. 41 In granting
ultimate control to the uppermost riparian, the doctrine places lower
riparian uses and projects in constant jeopardy. In affirming the
untrammeled sovereignty of the upper riparian, it senselessly denies
the claims of lower states in which the communal river may be as
much or more of a natural, territorial and "sovereign" asset. Ultimately the doctrine has failed to engender support because, as
persuasively presented by Professor Smith: "[The doctrine of absolute supremacy of the territorial sovereign] is... essentially anarchic
...permit[ting] every state to inflict irreparable injury upon its
neighbours without being amenable to any control save the threat of
portionment of InternationalRivers I: An American View, 1 U. BRT. COLUM. L. REv.

389 (1960).
30 See I MOORE, INTERNAnONAL LAW 654 (1906).

27 Convention Providing for the Equitable Distribution of the Waters of
the Rio
Grande for Irrigation Purposes, May 5, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953 (effective Dec. 26, 1906).
38See discussions in the Report of American Section of the Int'l Water Comm'n,
United States and Mexico, H.R. Doc. No. 359, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930); Simsarian,
op. cit. supra note 2.
30Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 466 (1922). See also cases cited note 1
supra, squarely identifying equitable apportionment as reflecting the rule to govern
interstate river disputes.
40Treaty With Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, arts. 8, 9, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. 994
(effective Nov. 8, 1945).
"'HearingsBefore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Treaty with Mexico
Relating to the Utilization of the Waters of Certain Rivers, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 19-21, pt. 5, at 1738-55 (1945); State Dep't Memorandum, Legal Aspects of the Use
of Systems of International Waters, S. Doc. No. 118, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1958);
The United States Position-Diversion of Columbia River Waters, 1956 PAc. N.W.
REGIONAL MEETING, Am. Soc'Y INT'L LAW 16-18, 21, 35.
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war." 42 Although the doctrine has been said to represent the state
practice of India 3 there is every indication that this too was merely
a matter of momentary political expediency to strengthen India's
position during negotiations with Pakistan concerning apportionment of the Indus River; the treaty settlement of this dispute reflects
44
a different principle altogether.
Having negatived X's right to use the river with utter impunity,
it remains to be affirmatively demonstrated that international law
would support the principle that X must use every reasonable means
to avoid substantial adverse effects on Y. Material is already abundant on this point and only a summary is presented here.
From one point of view, the principle is simply an extension of
the traditional tort maxim that one must use his own property so
as not to injure others. As restated by Professor Eagleton:
It seems safe.., to state as a general principle of international law that,
while each state has sovereign control within its own boundaries, in so
far as international rivers are concerned, a state may not exercise that
control without taking into account the effects upon other riparian states.
This is a negative statement, which I can as confidently put into positive
form in the old maxim sic utere tuo ut non alienum laedas.45
Other authors have arrived at the same point, not from the common
law tradition, but from Roman law tradition.4 Others, as Professor Oppenheim, would ground the principle as an illustration of
an abuse of right.4 7 And still others, as Hans Thalmann, derive the
principle from a more amorphous neighborship law.48 In any
event, the overwhelming opinion of international law publicists
40
supports the basic principle.

SMrrH, THE ECONOMIC USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIvERS 144-45 (1931).
See note 34 supra.
"'See Indus Water Treaty, 123 WoRID AFF. 99 (1960); text at notes 53, 106 infra.
See Berber, The Indus Water Dispute, 6 INDIAN YB. INT'L AFF. 46 (1957); 9 FOREIGN
Arr. REP'. 153 (1960).
45Eagleton, The Use of the Waters of International Rivers, 33 CAN. B. REV. 1018,
1021 (1955).
4"See, e.g., Neumeyer, Ein Beitrag zum internationalen Wasserrecht, FESTSCHuRIr
FUR GEORG COHN 143-44 (1915).
4" 1 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 28, at 345-47.
42

43

48

THALMANN, GRUNDPRINZIPIEN DES MODERNEN ZWISCHENSTAATLICHEN NACHBARRECIITS

159 (1951).
49 See BATY, THE CANONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (1930); BERBER, Op. Cit. supra
note 3, at 254 (Professor Berber is adamant, however, that the vague and inchoate
nature of the principle falls short of making it a general principle of law recognized
by civilized nations or a principle of customary law suitable for application by an
international tribunal); BPuaPLy, LAw OF NATIONS 205 (5th ed. 1955); HALL, INTER-
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In the same category of authority may be placed the views of the
International Law Association. Typical of its resolutions during
conferences over the last decade is the fourth resolution of the ILA
from its Dubrovnik Conference of 1956: "A State is responsible,
under international law, for public or private acts producing change
in the existing rdgime of a river to the injury of another State, which
it could have prevented by reasonable diligence."5 0 The restriction
on state X is derived not only from the opinions of highly qualified
publicists who comprise but a secondary source of international law
authority under article 38 of the I.C.J. statute. 5 ' The principle is
equally well endorsed by parallel treaty provisions,52 only the most
r

175 (8th ed. 1924); KAECKENDEECK, INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 181 (1918);
SxmTH, op. cit. supra note 42, at 151; Cardona, El Regimen Juridico de los Rios Internacionales, 56 RIVISTA DE DERECISO INTERNACIONAL 24 (1949); Griffin, Supra note
35, at 50; Hartig, whose views are discussed by Seidl-Hohenveldern, Austrian
Views on International Rivers, 9 ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS SARAVTENSIS 191 (1961);
Hostie, Problems of International Law Concerning Irrigation of Arid Lands,
31 INT'L AFF. 61 (1955); Huber, Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von der Gebietschoheit an
Grenzflussen, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VOLKERRECHT UND BUNDESSTAATSRECHT 160-63 (1907);
Sauser-Hall, L'Utilisation Industrielle des Fleuves Internationaux, 83 REC uEL DES
CoUPS ACADA-MIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 470, 517 (1953).
1;0
Waters of International Rivers: Resolution, 1956 INT'L L. ASS'N CONF. REP. 216,
242. See also Resolutions, 10 REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF INTER-AMERICAN BAR ASS'N
CONFERENCE (1957) [hereinafter cited as INTER-AM. BAR ASS'N CONF. REP.]; ECE REPORT
61; 24 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 170 (1911).
r' The International Court has never referred to the writings of a single author as
representing the "teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations" under the STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 38, para. 1 (d). See LAUTERPACHT, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 23 (1958).
2 See, e.g., Treaty Regarding Frontiers Between Costa Rica and Panama, May 1,
1941, 144 BRIT.ST.P. 751 (1941); Exchange of Notes Between the United Kingdom
and Brazil, March 15, 1940, 75 U.N.T.S. 72 (1947), ECE REPORT 149; Water Rights on
the Boundary Between Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi, Nov. 22, 1934, 139 BIUT.ST.P.
746 (1935), Brit. T.S. No. 42 (1938); Treaty Between France and Germany Regarding
the Delimitation of the Frontier, Aug. 14, 1925, 75 L.N.T.S. 264, 268; Agreement
Between South Africa and Portugal Regulating the Use of the Water of the Kunese
River, July 1, 1926, 123 BmiT.ST.P. 593 (1926); Treaty with Great Britain, Feb. 24,
1925, art. XI, 44 Stat. 2108, T.S. No. 721 (proclaimed July 17, 1925); Convention and
Protocol Between Finland and Norway Respecting the Legal Regime Governing the
Waters of the Pasvik and Jakobselv, Feb. 14, 1925, 122 BRIT.Sr.P. 530 (1925); Convention entre la France et les Pays-Bas pour fixer conventionnellement Ia limite entre les
colonies de ]a Guyane fran aise et de Suriname, Sept. 30, 1915, 110 BRIT.ST.P. 872
(1916); Convention entre ]a France et la Suisse pour l'Amdnagement de la Puissance
du Rh6ne entre l'usine projecte de la plaine et un point it determiner en a mont du
Pont de Pougny-Chancy-Berne, Oct. 4, 1913, 110 BRIT.ST.P. 886 (1916); Convention
entre la France et l'Italie pour 1'Utilisation des eaux de la Rivi&e la Roya et ses
Affluents, Dec. 17, 1914, 108 BRIT.ST.P. 467-68 (1914); Convention Between Sweden and
Norway Concerning Lakes and Waters in Common, Oct. 26, 1905, 98 BRrr.ST.P. 828,
829 (1905); Trait6 de Limites entre Leurs Majestds le Roi de Prusse et le Roi des
Pays-Bas, June 26, 1816, 3 BRIT.ST.P. 720, 729 (1816-1818). For additional references,
see BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 52-122 (1959); SMITH, op. cit. supra note 42,
NATIONAL LAW
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recent of which will be noted here. Some of these recent treaty
provisions make clear not only that unilateral appropriations to
the substantial detriment of co-riparians are excluded, but they also
provide concrete evidence of what constitutes "substantial detriment" by explicitly acknowledging the avoidable harm to certain
types of pre-existing uses. In our Case II, the existing irrigation
canals in State Y represent such a prior use, and current treaty
practice consistently harmonizes with the protection of this type
of use wherever avoidance of injury is reasonably available.
Foremost among these treaties is the Indus Water Treaty of
196053

accommodating India's interest in harnessing the western

rivers of the Indus basin for irrigation projects to serve India, without injuring pre-existing irrigation canals serving forty million
Pakistani. To insure that the Pakistan projects would not be adversely affected, it was agreed that currently unused eastern rivers
would be diverted to replenish the supply of water taken from the
Indus by the Indian projects. Significantly, India agreed to defray
the cost of the replacement diversions, even though the cost will
exceed one billion dollars; in doing so, it appears to recognize the
very principle contended for by Y in Case II, i.e., that in utilizing
an international river, X is obliged to use every reasonable means to
avoid substantial harm to co-riparians.
Similarly, the Nile Waters Agreement of 1959 between Egypt
and Sudan bound both parties to limit prospective diversions in a
manner which would not deprive existing uses in either country of
water currently being employed.5 4 And in the Columbia River
Treaty of 1960 between the United States and Canada, upper riparian flood control dams which might have been developed along the
Peace River with disruption of the Columbia's flow to established
downstream hydroelectric dams in the United States, were ultimately agreed upon only after construction of the dams in Canada
at 159-216; Hirsch, Utilization of International Rivers in the Middle East, 50 AM. J.
INT'L L. 81 (1956).
" Reported and discussed, 123 WORLD AFF. 99 (1960); Gupta, The Indus Waters
Treaty, 1960, 9 FOREIGN AFF. REP. 153 (1960); 55 AM%.
J. INT'L L. 797 (1961). Sec
also 1 REPORT OF THE INDUS COMMISSION (1950).
See also Convention Between
Yugoslavia and Austria Concerning Water Economy Questions Relating to the Drava,
May 24, 1954, 227 U.N.T.S. 111 (1956), in which Austria agreed to indemnify
Yugoslavia for damages resulting from Austrian interference with the flow of the
Drava River.
" See 13 Mm. EAST J. 422 (1959).
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was planned so as to avoid any injury to existing uses. 55 Along the
southern border, the 1944 treaty between Mexico and the United
States protected existing uses in both countries from harm which
might otherwise have been threatened by future projects in either
country.';
Professor Berber has written critically, however, that treaties
and parallel state practices are serviceable only as evidence of a
rule of customary international law; "general principles" are not
derived from these sources, but from abstraction based upon parallel
municipal law practices of a large majority of civilized states. If
Professor Berber is correct, the question arises whether a given treaty
provision or a given state practice was adopted, (a) as an affirmation
of what the parties understood to be required by customary law;
(b) as in stipulated derogation of customary law; or (c) merely ad
hoc, in the absence of any clear customary rule. Unless the treaty
provision represents an instance of (a), it allegedly lacks the element

of opinio juris, i.e., adoption from a sense of juridical obligation,
essential to give it any legal effect beyond committing the immediate,

signatory parties to a private international law contract. 58 Berber
feels that none of the many treaties he has examined in this context
clearly meets the opinio juris requirement, and thus he is quite

scornful of efforts to generalize. While he is not alone in those
views, 59 it is possible that he has overstated the case. 60
Professor Hyde maintains that something less than a sense of
G'See 44 DEP'T STATE BULL. 227 (1961); 12 EXTERNAL AFF. 870 (1960). Compare
Johnson, Effect of Existing Uses on the Equitable Apportionment of International
Rivers I: An American View, 1 U. BRIT. CoLum. L. REv. 389 (1960) with Goldie,
Effect of Existing Uses on the Equitable Apportionment of International Rivers II:
A Canadian View, 1 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. Riv. 399 (1960).
"Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Nov. 14, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994
(effective Nov. 8, 1945).
" BERBER, op. cit. supra note 28, at 45-46, 168-69, 185-86 (1959).
BERBER, SOME METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE
r ld. at 136-56.
STUDY ON THE USE OF THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL RIvERs 8-10 (1957).
See authori-

ties cited, note 88 infra; Kunz, The Nature of Customary InternationalLaw, 47 Am.
J. INT'L L. 662 (1953).
" Ibid.
00 A strict opinio juris requirement might propound customary international law
on the basis of mistaken impressions. "On the one hand it is said that usage plus
opinio juris leads to such norm; that, on the other hand, in order to lead to such norm,
the states must already practice the first cases with the opinio juris. Hence, the very
coming into existence of such norm would presuppose that the states acted in legal
error." Kunz, supra note 58, at 667. See also KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND
STATE 114 (1949).
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obligation will suffice to validate parallel treaty provisions as a source
of customary law.0 ' Professor Hudson believes that a sense of consistency with international practice, rather than a sense of juridical
duty, would suffice.0 2 Judge Lauterpacht agrees with the olpinio
juris requirement, but softens the burden of proof by creating a
rebuttable presumption of its presence when the particular treaty
provision is in line with a frequent and widespread practice.03 Professor Schwarzenberger avoids the problem by urging that general
state and treaty practices may at least evidence a "general principle"
of international law, even should they fail to meet the harsher quali4
fications as evidence of some customary rule.
These mitigants of opinio juris are persuasive, if only because
the rigour of opinio juris, when stringently applied, unrealistically
impedes the development of international law. Treaty negotiations
are seldom recorded and generally involve a host of policy considerations for both parties. It is scarcely ever possible to isolate
a particular reason to account for the character of the treaty, aside
from declarations in the preamble or the body of the treaty itself.
Treaty declarations that a particular provision was adopted because
of or in spite of customary law are, understandably, very rare.
But this does not mean that considerations of law may not have
played a substantial part in the treaty settlement, or that the admixture of desire to conform with established norms and more political considerations is without evidentiary value. It seems utterly
unrealistic to divorce political considerations for adopting treaty
provisions from juridical considerations, because the latter obviously
play a substantial part in shaping and in "selling" the former, i.e.,
the bargaining position of a state is measurably strengthened to the
extent that it can support its national demands on appeals to generally observed, international practice. This, it seems, singularly accounts for Pakistan's success in persuading the International Bank
and India that India should defray the costs of replacing water
02 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1945).
For related views which substantially jettison an opinio juris requirement in the formulation of customary international law, see KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 311-12 (1952); SIERRA,
TRATADO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PUBLICO 25 (2d ed. 1955); Guggenheim, Les
Deux AIdments de la coditume en droit international, 1 *rUDFS EN L'HONNEUR DE G.
ScETLL 280 (1950).
12 Hudson, Working Paper on Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.

4/16 (1950).
63

LAUTERPACHT,

op. cit. supra note 51, at 379-80.
LAW 39-49 (3d ed. 1957).

O'SCHIWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL
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diverted from the eastern rivers; no other hypothesis is quite so
consistent with the efforts of Pakistan's counsel to carry his case to
the International Law Association on so many occasions, to debate
for their support.
The same borrowing from legal principles to buttress a national
policy position is evident in the treatment of the Lake Lanoux
dispute. Initially, France argued that it was entitled to divert water
from the Carol River without substituting water from the Ariege
River, even though this would have resulted in a substantially
diminished flow from Lake Lanoux into Spain. Before carrying its
case to the Court of Arbitration, however, France altered its position
so as fully to protect Spain's interest in the undiminished flow.
French policy probably would not have taken such a turn involving
considerable expense to France, had it not felt that its position before a neutral arbitrator would be improved as a legal consideration.
It therefore seems entirely reasonable that while we can seldom
isolate opinio juris elements as alone accounting for the recent,
general uniform willingness of states to use all reasonable means
not to injure co-riparian interests, the coincidence and frequency
of this policy is compelling; surely it is relevant for a court to consider in resolving Case II. And if this is so, then the principle we
have examined is a sound one. No treaty within the past twenty
years has actually disregarded substantial interests of co-riparians,
and only one has declared that the treaty provision is not to be considered representative of the parties' view of their duty.
The Lake Lanoux decision is the only international tribunal
decision involving sovereign states and the division of economic
rights in international rivers. There are, however, a number of
municipal decisions which, while not relevant immediately as
judicial decisions under article 38 (a), may evidence "general principles" of international law under 38 (c), since they tend to reflect
parallel state practices from which certain propositions applicable
to the community of states can be generalized.6 5 That a state must
not affect the condition of the river whenever reasonably avoidable
is agreed by all municipal courts which have had occasion to consider the problem. Hostie has accurately characterized the Ameri-

"See

Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, 35 ANT. J. INT'L L. 684

(1941); Hostie,

supra note 49, at 69; 1 REPORT OF THE INDUS COMMISSION 54 (1950). But see BERBER,
op. cit. supra note 58, at 4, 51; BERBER, RVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 171-72; Case of

the S.S.

"Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
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can cases in the following manner: "In all relevant cases, the
[Supreme] Court has primarily applied a rule of law ... that a
riparian State must abstain from causing substantial injury to
another riparian State of the same river system, where appropriate,
by diversion including storage. '"66 In 1927, the Deutsches Staatsgerichtshof declared: "No State has the right to cause substantial
injury to the interests of another State by the use it makes of the
waters of a natural waterway." 67 The same proposition is recognized
in the Rau Report which antedated settlement of the Indus River
dispute by treaty,6 and again the view appears in dicta of the Italian
Court of Cassation, in a 1939 decision involving clarification of
Franco-Italian interests in the Roya:
[A]lthough a State in the exercise of its right of sovereignty, may subject
public rivers to whatever regime it deems best, it cannot disregard the
international duty, derived from that principle, not to impede or to
destroy, as a result of this regime, the opportunity of the other States to
avail themselves of the flow of water for their own national needs.6 9
And notwithstanding his reluctance to use municipal practice as
evidence of customary law, Professor Berber derives this much from
municipal experience among civilized states: "Underlying almost
every such system is a principle according to which the user must in
70
some way take into consideration the use of water by other users."
It is submitted that the "way" in which this consideration has uniformly been acknowledged is to condition the right of exploitation
of a riparian state on the requirement that it use every reasonable
means to avoid substantial injury to co-riparians.
As an aspect of equitable apportionment, this rule has substantial
predictive application. First, it means in the case of X versus Y that
Y's objection to the X project should be sustained, since X could
"' Hostie, supra note 49, at 68. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945),
modified, 345 U.S. 981 (1953); Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 (1940); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 298 U.S. 573 (1936); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 260 U.S. 1 (1922); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). See also
BERBER, RIvERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 247-52 (1959); SMITH, op. cit. supra note 42, at
105-17.
'6 ANNUAL
DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 128
(Lauterpacht ed.
1927-1928).
(81 REPORT OF THE INDUS COMMISSION (1950).
60Soci
3nergie tlectrique du Littoral M6diterranen v. Compagnia Imprese
Elettriche Liquri, ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 121 (Lauterpacht ed. 1938-1940).
7 BERBER, op. cit. supra note 35, at 254.
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avoid altering the river flow by either of two reasonable means.
Second, taken in combination with the rule of law examined earlier,
it means that in the event that X does install breakwaters to avoid
any substantial harm to Y, X is then entitled to proceed with its
hydroelectric project without further complaint from Y. This simply amounts to an application of the earlier rule, just as easily
restated here in its traditional, negative tone as applied to Y: "No
State is justified in opposing the unilateral action of another in
utilizing waters, if such action neither causes nor threatens any
appreciable injury to the former State." 71 These elementary rules
will settle most of the cases where the facts make clear that use by
one riparian can be secured without unavoidable harm to co-riparians. Where the hydroelectric dam threatens navigation, the rules
suggest that the construction of the dam is conditioned upon the
development by the proposing state of a navigable route around the
dam. If it is a matter of irrigation for the proposing state, then the
duty would be to replenish lower riparian rivers with other available
streams, as in the Indus settlement. Again, it will subsequently be
seen that these rules too are merely particular applications of the
broader principle of equitable apportionment.
CASE III

State X's hydroelectric project (otherwise described in Case
I1), will accelerate the water of the Z River enough to quicken the
erosion of a small island in the middle of the river just on the Y
side of the border. The island is useful only to support a summer
cottage of a Y resident, and the island is worth ten thousand
dollars. An installation of breakwaters necessary to avoid any
damage to the island would cost X five hundred thousand dollars.
At first glance the case appears to fall within the rule used in

Case II, obliging X to take expensive precautionary measures before
using the river. But the rule is qualified so that Y's objection would
be sustained only if: (a) the unavoidable injury to its interests is
substantial; or (b) although the unavoidable injury is not substantial, X refuses to offer adequate compensation for the damage.
If measures are taken by X to compensate Y for the trivial damage,
short of leaving the river exactly as it was due to the disproportionate
expense of this measure, the combination of reasonable compensation with a residue of merely trivial injury to Y ought to free X to
7"This is, of course, a restatement of the principle we derived from the discussion
of Case I, supra, with the emphasis now resting more on an "abuse of right" theory.
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develop its interest unilaterally. Thus, X could discharge its legal
obligation by paying Y the money value of the island, much as
Egypt has recently agreed to compensate Sudan for the money value
of land which will unavoidably be flooded from the waters of the
Aswan Dam. 2

This, of course, does not mean that Y has sustained

no damage whatever, for certainly a state may prefer to have property
to the property's money's worth. Nevertheless, the residue of damage after compensation is so trivial in comparison with the five
hundred thousand dollar cost of avoiding it altogether, that a court
should consider the matter as de minimis and allow X to proceed
with its project under our first rule.
That trivial damage to a riparian is not sufficient grounds to
thwart proposed uses by co-riparians, is well supported by many of
the same authorities we have previously reviewed. The ECE Report
declares:
A State has the right to develop unilaterally that section of the waterway
which traverses or borders its territory, insofar as such development is
liable to cause in the territory of another State, only slight injury or
minor inconvenience compatible with good neighborly relations. 73
The Madrid Declarations of 1911 speak of forbidding only those
unilateral appropriations which would "seriously interfere" or
"seriously modif[y]" the river's flow. 74 Professor Smith condemns
only that kind of unilateral action which threatens "appreciable"
injury to co-riparian interests.1 5
Illustrative treaty provisions include the Swedish-Norwegian
Treaty of Karlstadt of 1905, most significant because it is one of the
few treaties which expressly rests the critical provision on international law:
Conforming to general principles of international law, it is understood
that works ...shall not be executed in one of the two States without the
consent of the other, every time that these works in affecting the water
situated in the other State sensibly hinder the use of the water course
72 See Nile Waters Agreement, 13 MID. EAST J. 422 (1959)
(£l5 million to compensate Sudan).
73 ECE REPORT 61
(Emphasis added.)
724 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 170 (1911) (Emphasis
added.); SMITH, op. cit. supra note 42, at 156; ECE REPORT 261. For similar treaty
provisions, see, e.g., Convention Relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power
Affecting More Than One State, Dec. 9, 1923, 36 L.N.T.S. 76, 81, Br. T.S. No. 26
(1925); Convention entre ]a France et l'Italie pour l'Utilisation des Eaux de ]a Riviire
la Roya et ses Affluents, Dec. 17, 1914, 108 BRIT.ST.P. 467-68 (1914).
75 SAMTH, op. cit. supra note 42, at 151.

Vol. 1964: 807]

INTERNATIONAL RIVER DISPUTES

827

for navigation or the floating of logs, 7or otherwise effect serious changes
in the water over a considerable area. 6
Turning again to judicial decisions, note that the Donauversinkung case denied the right of a state to act only where "substantial" injury was involved. 77 And in the American case of Kansas
v. Colorado,78 the right of the upper riparian to utilize an interstate
river for irrigation needs was sustained over proof by the lower
riparian that some slight damage would result. Professor SauserHall has summarized the municipal practice of Italy and Switzerland
in this manner: "A single principle appears to be generally respected:
no alteration of a watercourse which would effect substantial preju79
dice to other riparians is allowable."
There is reason to believe, therefore, that a useful set of international law principles is emerging to provide that a state may utilize
an international river for economic purposes under any of the following conditions:
a) Where the proposed use will have no effect on the flow of the
water through coriparian states;
b) Where the proposed use would adversely affect substantial
interests of coriparians but the proposing state undertakes
additional measures to safeguard the coriparian interests fully;
c) Where the proposing state acts to avoid substantial injury occasioned by its project and adequate compensation is made
for the residue of injury which is not substantial.
There remains to be considered a final and more difficult situation: the case where exploitation of the river by one riparian will
necessarily have a substantial adverse effect on coriparians and where
the means of avoiding injury is not reasonably within the economic
capacity of the proposing state.
CASE IV

X and Y are contiguous national states through which the
River Z passes. X is the upper riparian and proposes to divert a
substantial part of the Z River for use in a massive hydroelectric
70 Convention Between Sweden and Norvay Concerning Lakes and Rivers in
Common, Oct. 26, 1905, 98 BRIT.ST.P. 828, 829 (1905). (Emphasis added.) See also
1 (2) FAUCHILLE, Ti.ArIt DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 498-99 (1925).

77ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASEs 128 (Lauterpacht ed. 1927-

1928).
'8206 U.S. 46, 113, 114, 117 (1906); Hostie, supra note 49, at 61.
70 Sauser-Hall, supra note 49, at 471, 517. (Emphasis added.)
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project which would convert X from a marginal agrarian economy
to a prosperous industrial economy supporting ten million people
within its 230,000 square mile area. Until now X has scarcely
used the River Z.
Y, the lower riparian, has gradually drawn upon the River Z
in ever increasing measure to support its expanding agricultural
basin. This basin is the principal source of Y's wealth; its surplus
food production has enabled Y to achieve a favorable trade balance
resulting in prosperity for the fifteen million Y inhabitants. As Y
increased its irrigation supply from the Z River from time to time,
its government notified the government of X of these developments. The government of X replied to each notice only with a
terse statement that it acknowledged no right in Y to the continued
flow of the River Z, and that it would reserve all of its sovereign
rights under international law. Some of the Y irrigation canals
are more than one hundred years old; others have been completed
within the last five years, and still others-at the time when X
proposed to divert the river-were under construction. Some of
the existing Y canals are extremely inefficient, losing large quantities of water through absorption, evaporation, and flooding from
irregular levelling. Some of the most efficient canals serve areas
in Y which are relatively unproductive.
The diversion proposed by X would cut off more than eighty
per cent of the Z River. It would take water away from more than
fifty per cent of Y's arable land, ruin thousands of Y farmers, and
impair the national economy of Y. While it would be possible to
avoid this by returning most of the diverted flow to the Z riverbed
after use in the X hydroelectric project, this could only be accomplished by a rerouting system on the X-Y border at the cost of
three billion dollars, a figure somewhat in excess of X's entire
annual gross national product.
After prolonged negotiation, X and Y have reached an impasse:
X is determined to proceed with the hydroelectric project to develop its industrial potential, and Y is equally determined that it
shall not lose its existing and projected irrigation system. By
mutual agreement, the dispute is submitted for arbitration according to "accepted principles of international law."
One response would be for the court to determine which use,
that of X or that of Y, enjoys a qualitative superiority over the other.
This suggests that we should undertake a canvass of international law
to develop a ranking of uses, with a ruling in favor of hydroelectric
uses or irrigation uses, whichever is to be preferred. But aside from
certain ad hoc rankings accomplished by treaty 0 and a few tradi8OTreaty With Mexico Respecting Utilization of Water of the Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Nov. 14, 1944, art. III, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No.
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tionalists who stress the primacy of navigation, me consensus is
clearly that no a' piiori'division of ighs"'can be secuted 'in such a
supeificial fashion.'
The ECE Report of 1952 concluded its'own survey with this
observation: "It is difficult to establish.,priorities among these interests, and consequently difficult to classify the uses towhieh the
waterways can be put."8 2 , Similarly,'Professo Sauser-H.all has -mdde
arIindependent review of treaty practice, condludin : The juridical
83
situation remains in flux, full of unknowns and uncertanties.
Smith,8 4 Eagleton s5 Hirsch,8 6 and Griffin8 7 concur. It is obvious that
international law could not reasonably resolve Cose 2V by this'means,
for a moment's reflection makes clear 'that stares with an-economy
substantially dependent upon cell established irrigation -uses in the
pdsition of Y would not ordinarily agree to the abandonmentf of
these interests' merely because a coiparian proposed to harness the
river for hydroelectric purposes; nor 'would states in the position of
X customarily abandon the improvement of their economy by
conceding that competing interests of^ coriparians in iriigatibn enjoy an absolute priority. Even if states were inclined to regard a
river basin as an indivisible unit, and even if they would. defer to
the type of use of greater benefit- to the greatest number of people,
the character of that more beneficial use obviously will vary from
region to region: the importance of navigation on the Danube, for
instance, clearly giving way to the pre eminence. of 'irrigation oil
the Indus.
And, finally, settlement of disputes on this basiswould necessarily
994 (effective Nov. -8, 1945); Treaty With, Great Britain Relating to Boundary Waters
Between the United States and Canada, Jan. 11, 1909, art. Viii. 36 Stat.,2448 (effective
May 13, 1910); 1 REPORT OF THE INDUS COMMISSION 11 (1950).
1

B I(2) FAUcHILLE, TRArrA DE Dkorr INTERNATIONAL PUBL1C'452t(l25);. The materials
cited in note 80 supra, however, rank navigation after domestic, industrial and agricultural' uses. Set also Laylin, Principles of Law Governing Use of Int'ernationai
Rivers, 10 INTER-Ara. BAR. ASS'N CoNF. REP. 14 (1957).
82
ECE REPORT 210.
"'Sans'er-Hall, supra note 49, at' 538.
81SIITH, THE ECONOMsIC USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIvERs 152 3(1931), Smith, The
Waters of the Jordan,25 INT'L AFr. 415 (1949).
' Eagleton, The Use of, the Wqtors of International Riverm, 33 CAN, BL REv. 1918,
1025 (1955).
10Hirsch, 'Utilization of International Rivers in the Middlej East, 50 Am.J, INT'L L.
81, 99 (1956).
8TState Dep't Memorandum, Legal Aspects of' the'Use of- Systems of Intethational
Waters, S. Doc. No. 118, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 90, 91 (1958). See also, 1956 INrL L.
ASS'N CONF. REP. 216.
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ignore the fact that certain types of uses have become important only
in recent decades; thus, circumstances which might have supported
the paramount significance of navigation on rivers in general are
no longer applicable, if, indeed, they ever were. As noted by Berber:
The uses of flowing water other than navigation, fishing and floatage
were until recently either too unimportant to occasion serious examination, e.g., the use of water by mills, or else, although in themselves important, e.g., irrigation in arid countries, were too far removed from the
main areas of international intercourse to attract the interest of international law. 8
A simple alternative solution might be to adopt a rule of international law requiring an arithmetically equal division of any
particular river's water, as followed in an Austro-Czechoslovakian
treaty of 1928, and more recently in a Russo-Iranian treaty of 1959,
affecting the waters of the Aras and Atrak rivers. But in neither of
these cases was there any question at the time that the rivers would
support projects contemplated by both parties, and thus there was no
occasion to consider proper apportionment of a scarce commodity,
as in Case IV. Moreover, there is otherwise no authority to support
such a scheme, and again, arithmetical apportionment without regard to the types of uses, their comparative value, their wastefulness,
the relative population, arable land, degree of industrialization of
each state, etc., renders the whole idea fanciful.
A third approach would seem to be available, supported by a
principle of prior consent and a principle which protects existing
uses. Since X is the state which currently seeks to utilize the river
in a manner inflicting substantial and unavoidable damage to Y, it
might be thought that Y may prevail simply by withholding its
consent and by demonstrating to a tribunal's satisfaction that X's
proposed use violates a sic utere principle. Independently of this
argument, it might also rely on the primacy of her own existing uses
as settling the matter, a suggestion traceable to Vattel who viewed
a "first use" as perfecting a claim grounded in the tradition of territorial sovereignty:
[T]he nation that first established her dominion on one of the banks of
the river is considered as being the first possessor of all that part of the
river which bounds her territory.
If that nation has made any use of the river, as, for navigation or
88 BERBER, RivERs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1959).
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fishing, it is presumed with greatest certainty that she has resolved to

appropriate the river to her own use.8 9

The primacy of existing uses, as a principle which forecloses other
riparians from drawing on an international river in a manner which
would disrupt those uses, has been enthusiastically supported by
John Laylin who represented Pakistan in the recent dispute with
India over the Indus River system.90 Largely through his efforts,
it has also generated support within a number of international law
associations.9 '
A number of recent treaties apparently acknowledge the inviolability of pre-existing uses, even without questioning their possible lesser value to the river system as a whole. In apportioning
VAT"EL, THE LAw OF NATIONS 120 (1870).
00"As a rule, the protection of uses, lawful when they came into existence, so long
as they remain beneficial, has been treated as an absolute first charge upon the
waters.... In less favored regions, not only are existing uses protected, but as between existing uses those first established ordinarily enjoy a priority over uses established later." Laylin, supra note 81, at 12. See also 1956 INT'L L. ASS'N CONF. REP. 12;
Laylin & Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in 'International Water Disputes, 53 Aim.
J. INT'L L. 30, 38 (1959).
01 See, e.g., First Report of the Committee on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, 1956 INT'L L. Ass'N CONF. REP. IV (1956).
For additional support of pre-existing uses, see I REPORT OF THE INDUS CONUISSION
10-11 (1950) ("In the general interest of the entire community inhabiting dry, arid
territories, priority may usually have to be given to an earlier irrigation project over
a later one: 'priority of appropriation gives superiority of right.' "); Convention of
1923 ratified by Great Britain, Northern Ireland, New Zealand, Denmark, Greece, Siam,
Southern Rhodesia, and Newfoundland, art. 2, 36 L.N.T.S. 76, 81 (1925); Convention
Between Persia and Russia defining the Boundary Between the Two Countries East
of the Caspian Sea, Dec. 9, 1881, art. IV, 73 BRIT.ST.P. 97 (1882); Decret de
l'Empereur des Franqaise, portant promulgation du Trait6 de Delimiation conclu,
le 26 Mai, 1866, entre la France et l'Espagne, July 14, 1866, art. X, 56 BRIT.ST.P. 212,
226 (1866); Convention de D6limitation, entre les Pays-Bas et la Belgique, Aug. 8,
1843, art. 37, 35 BRIT.ST.P. 1202 (1847); Traitd de Limites entre Leurs Majestds le
Roi fde Prusse et le Roi des Pays-Bas, June 26, 1816, 3 BRIT.ST.P. 720 (1816); U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. Rc. 8th year, 649th Meeting 21 (S/PV.649) (1953); Hearings
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Treaty With Mexico Relating to
the Utilization of the Waters of Certain Rivers, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 19-21
(1945); Report of Special Master, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 7 Original,
Oct. Term, 1943, p. 109: "A rule that would seem elementary in equitable distribution (even aside from legal right based on priority statutes) is that present rightful
uses should be preferred to prospective uses under possible future development." To
some extent, the suggestion has found favor with Andrassy, who illustrates its operative effect in the following manner: "Certain developments and constructions have
taken place before the conflict of interest and the necessity for regulation made
themselves felt. In such a case, one applies the principle of acquired rights. The
priority of the existing fact is respected, since needs have already been adapted
to those possibilities created by this previous construction."
Andrassy, Le Droit
International De 'oisinage, 79 RECUEIL DES COURs ACADL,%IE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
89

77, 119 (1951).
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the Nile River, the Sudan agreed that the disproportionately large
share which Egypt was already using for irrigation purposes would
be recognized. 9 2 But the case is not entirely on point, for the apportionment of the surplus greatly favored Sudan so as to redress
the historic imbalance, and it appeared that the proposed uses in
both.countries could be accommodated from the whole river without
substantial, damage to the interests of either-a saving feature critically absent from Case IV. Moreover, the treaty was not considerate
of Tanganyika, Ethiopia, or the Congo, all of which may feel prejudiced by the one hundred per cent division between Sudan and
Egypt. Thus the primacy of pre-existing uses along the Nile has
not yet finally been tested.
It is true also that India has agreed to underwrite the cost of
diverting eastern rivers to protect the pre-existing uses in Pakistan,
and that the cost of this replacement exceeds one billion dollars. 3'
But, again, the case is distinguishable; in Case IV, the damage to Y
is not similarly avoidable because the cost of the rerouting system
exceeds three billion dollars and could not reasonably be sustained
by a country as small or poor as X. Indeed, in the Indus River case
itself, the cost of avoiding harm to Pakistan in fact is borne largely
by the World Bank and the United States Government.
The Columbia River Treaty of 1960 would appear to support
pre-existing use protections, since Canada ultimately abandoned its
threat to develop flood control dams by diverting water from the
Columbia River so as to cut off supply to existing hydroelectric
dams in the United States. 94 But this too was simply another case
where the threatened harm was wholly avoidable by reasonable
means, and the case better fits under our second principle than
here. 95 Moreover, in return for constructing the dams to increase
the amount and uniformity of flow on the United States side, Canada
secured an agreement by the United States to share equally in all
power increases attributable to the Canadian dams, an example of
developing the basin as a whole, rather than' apportionment of
severable assets. This agreement by the United States would not
have been required had the United States felt secure in relying
entirely on the primacy of pre-existing uses, since the power plants
02 See note 54 supra.

See note 44 supra.
01 See note 55 supra.
95 Ibid. See also discussion in text at notes 45-71 supra.
03
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which will benefit from the Canadian program already existed along
the river on the American side; the United States might therefore
have asserted that it needed to make no concessions whatever, in
restraining Canada from diverting the river.
In another area of the world, the Russo-Iranian treaty of 1959
protects pre-existing Iranian uses, but this is not convincing towards
establishing such protection as an axiom of international, law because the river appeared to both parties as capable of supporting
their mutual needs without any substantial adverse effect on the
interests of either. 96
The primacy of pre-existing uses as a tentative rule of law must
be discounted, however, not merely because there is but meager
authority to support it, but because the reasons given to support it
are not convincing in every context-certainly not in Case IV. The
first of these reasons has already been alluded to by Andrassy, that
pre-existing uses are to be respected "since needs have already been
adapted to those possibilities created by this previous construction." 97
The same persuasion is offered by Laylin, that prior appropriations
have resulted in a dependent relationship which it is essentially unfair to disturb by subsequent demands on the limited resources of
a river. The problem is, however, that although this dependent
relationship is relevant, it can hardly be allowed to tyrannize over
other considerations without producing even more unfortunate consequences for the river basin considered as a whole. In Case IV,
while it is clear that pre-existing irrigation uses in Y have contributed much to the Y economy, it is also clear that many of the canals
are enormously wasteful and that others serve relatively unproductive areas. It seems wholly unrealistic to condemn or foreclose the
development of the X economy, with its promise of benefiting a
larger number of people and in a more efficient manner, merely
because Y's uses were prior in time. It seems doubtful too that Y
may reasonably rely upon its investment and dependence on its irrigation system to prevent X's proposed diversions, since X at no time
misled Y as to X's interest in the river flow, and at all times made
clear that it regarded its vital interests as untrammeled by the Y
developments.
The other reason commonly brought forward to support the
00 See 13

M D.EAST J. 193 (1959).

07Andrassy,

supra note 91, at 119-21.
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protection of pre-existing uses is the incentive which such a rule
provides to promote the rapid and complete utilization of river resources: by agreeing that one prior in time is prior in right, international law would encourage the timely utilization. of waters which
might otherwise continue to run uselessly to the sea for lack of
security for any state to make necessary investments, unhampered by
a rule of prior consent.
Again, however, the rule giving primacy to pre-existing uses
exceeds the merit of the reason offered in its behalf; adoption of the
rule as a principle of international law would result in river communities repenting at leisure what was constructed in haste. The
economic future of X is blighted because Y was fortuitously able to
devise a cheaper use of the river water in simple, but wasteful, irrigation canals, while X was obliged to wait for technological advances
and the acquisition of greater financial means. Water uses are hurried along by one country from apprehension that coriparians may
otherwise succeed in establishing some other absolute first claim.
No equitable solution of Case IV can be derived from a myth that
existing uses are always to be protected against any subsequent proposals, even where substantial harm to those uses is not reasonably
avoidable by any unilateral action of the proposing state.
Nevertheless, there is some element of sense in the doctrine
of pre-existing uses which may provide a guide when employed more
flexibly, as one consideration within a larger principle. It would be
sound to place primary emphasis on a rule which will facilitate the
fullest development of the river for the whole community. What
is needed is a formulation which will combine the legitimate aspects
of both doctrines-that of prior consent and that of existing uses-to
assure the expeditious apportionment of river benefits in the most
equitable manner consistent with full utilization of the river system.
To the extent that respect for prior consent guarantees that no
legitimate aspiration of any interested riparian shall be ignored in
developing a river basin, its requirement as a matter of law is to be
applauded; it is to be deplored only if it is taken to confer an
unqualified veto, enabling each riparian to frustrate river development except on its own terms. To the extent that the protection of
pre-existing uses encourages a riparian to develop a river system by
providing assurance that projects carefully constructed cannot be
disregarded cavalierly by subsequent coriparian developments, it
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too is a laudable principle; it is to be deplored only if it is taken to
insulate every antique or extravagant use from review, no matter
how little its comparative value to the contemporary community
may be.
These elements, just as the regional superiority of a certain type
of use, the presence of certain treaty arrangements, technological
changes, comparative dependence of economies upon the river,
etc., are obviously relevant but not independently conclusive considerations in the equitable apportionment of an international river
treated as an integrated whole. Just as Case IV has elements in
common with nearly every recent river dispute, and yet itself is different from them all at least in the altered prominence of one feature
over another, so it is obvious that none of the considerations within
the overriding principle of equitable apportionment can be converted into law suitable by itself for every system; each simply represents an interest which competes for protection in each case, more
or less relevant as it contributes to the expeditious development of
the river system as a whole, with due regard for the several interests
of all riparians.
And this, it is now becoming clear, is what is generally meant
by the principle of "equitable apportionment" as it has been applied
in American municipal law, 98 in the settlement of the Indus, 99 the
D",[D]isputes [over interstate rivers] are to be settled on the basis of equality of
right. But this is not to say that there must be an equal division of waters of an
interstate stream among the States through which it flows. It means that the
principles of right and equity shall be applied having regard to the 'equal level or
plane on which all the States stand, in point of power and right, under our constitutional system' and that, upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending
States and all other relevant facts this Court will determine what is an equitable
apportionment of the use of such waters." Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S.
660, 670-71 (1931). "But if an allocation between appropriation States is to be just
and equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not be possible. For example,
the economy of a region may have been established on the basis of junior appropriation;. So far as possible those established uses should be protected though strict
application of the priority rule might jeopardize them." Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589, 618 (1945). See Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 523-24 (1936) (wasteful
existing uses not treated as a fixed charge on the river); see cases cited notes 1, 66
supra; Hostie, Problems of InternationalLaw Concerning Irrigation of Arid Lands, 31
INT'L AFF. 61 (1935).
11 Note 44 supra. "It follows from [these principles] that the rights of the several
units concerned in this dispute must be determined by applying... the rule of
'equitable apportion,' each unit being entitled to a fair share of the waters of the
Indus and its tributaries." I REPORT OF THE INDUS COMMISSION 10-13 (1950). "The
water resources of the Indus basin should be cooperatively developed and used in
such manner as most effectively to promote the economic development of the Indus
basin viewed as a unit." Letter by Eugene Black, President of the World Bank,
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Columbia,10 0 the Nile, 10 1 the Oder, 102 or the Jordan 0 3 river disputes,
or in the resolutions of the International Law Association. 104 The
same principle emerges clearly under various names put forward by
other writers. Thus, Hartig has written of a "principle of coherence,"' 0 5 and the President of the International Bank was firm in
declaring that the Indus river was to be "used in such manner as
most effectively to promote the economic development of the Indus
basin viewed as a unit."106 Professor Eagleton has spoken of the'
"integrated river system," and the "unified system,"' 0 7 while Fortuin
of the Netherlands speaks of the "fullest possible profit," and Garland of "full utilization."' 0
Professor Sauser-Hall has observed
the phenomenon of equitable apportionment at work in state practice in the following way:
We are confronted with a remarkable illustration of an international
practice not based originally on precise rules, but which has moved so
consistently toward a consensus of concordant unilateral acts that it
ultimately served as a basis for a treaty manifesting the idea of a coinin Berber, The Indus Water Dispute, 6 INDIAN YB. INT'L AFF. 46, 57 (1957). (Emphasis
added.) The resulting treaty closely conforms to this suggestion.
100See text at note 96 supra, and at note 110 infra.
201 Note 54 supra.
102 "But when consideration is given to the manner in which states have regarded
the concrete situatigns arising out of the fact that a single waterway traverses or
separates the territory of more than one state, and the possibility of fulfilling the
requirements of justice and the considerations of utility which this fact places in
relief, it is at once seen that a solution of the problem has been sought not in the
idea of a right of passage in favour of upstream states, but in that of a community
of interest of riparian states. This community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the
perfect equality of all riparian states in the use of the whole course of the river
and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any riparian state in relation to
others." Judgment No. 16, P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23, at 27 (1929).
103 See Dees, Jordan's East Ghor Canal Project, 13 MID. EAST J. 357 (1959).
101See 1958 INT'L L. Ass'N CONF. REP. 28; Principles of Law Governing the Uses of
International Rivers, 1956 INT'L L. Ass'n CONF. REP. 241. See also Resolutions, 10
INzTER-A,,. BAR Ass',x CoNF. REP. at 82 (1957); Texte Ddfinitif de la RMsolution tel
qu'Audopt6 au Cours de ]a Seance, Institut de Droit International, translated in 56
A, t.J. INT'L L. 737 (1962): "Considering that the maximum utilization of available
natural resources is a matter of common interest ...if the States are in disagreement
over the scope of their rights of utilization, settlement will take place on the basis of
equity, taking particular account of their respective needs, as well as of other
pertinent circumstances." Id.
10 Ein neuer Ausgangspunkt fir internationale wasserrechtliche Regulungen: das
Koharenzprinzip, 1958 IVASSER- UND ENERGIE-WIRTSCHAFT; Seidl-Hohenveldern, Austrian
Views on InternationalRivers, 9 A-NALEs UNIVERSITATIS SARAVIENSIS
100See letter cited note 99 supra. (Emphasis added.)
107 Eagleton, supra note 85, at 1021-23.
.10Id.at 1028.

191

(1961).
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munity of interests founded on good neighbor relations entirely subject
to international law. 10 9

The principle of equitable apportionment has gained impressive
support from treaties and juridical decisions as well as from highly
qualified publicists." 0 Its fundamental emphasis is upon the maximum utilization of fluvial resources of a river basin treated as a
whole.
This principle will not, of course, operate to parcel a river in
the same fashion in every case-no more than does the "due process"
or "equal protection" clauses of the United States Constitution
It does, however, provide
act identically on differing facts."'
lo Sauser-Hall, L'Utilisation Industrielle Des Fleuves Internationaux, 83 RECUEIL
DES CouRs, ACD1-MIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 471, 581-82 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
110 See Resolution, 24 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 365 (1911);
Griffin, Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters, S. Doc. No. 118,
85th Cong. 2d Sess. 90 (1958): "Riparians are entitled to share in the use and benefits
of a system of international waters on a just and reasonable basis.... In determining
what is just and reasonable account is to be taken of rights arising out of... comparison
of the economic and social gains accruing, from the various possible uses of the
waters in question, to each riparian and to the entire area dependent upon the waters
in question." Id. (Emphasis added.) SxNm, THE ECONOMIC USES OF INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS (1931): "The first principle is that every river system is naturally an indivisible
physical unit, and that as such it should be developed as to render the greatest possible service to the whole human community which it serves, whether or not that community is divided into two or more political jurisdictions." Id. at 150-51. See also
Cardona, El Regimen Juridico de los Rios Internacionales, 56 REV. DE DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL 24 (1949); ECE REPORT at 60.
For supporting cases, see, e.g., Donauversinking Case, 116 Entscheidungen des
Reichgerichts in Zivilsachen, Anhang 18 (1927), also reported in ANNUAL DIGEST OF
PUBLIC INT'L LAW CASES 128 (Lauterpacht ed. 1927-28): "An attempt must be made
to apportion or measure the respective interests in an equitable manner balancing
the advantages gained by one state against the injury, or possible injury, caused to
another." Id. Leitha River Case, 1 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 594 (1940);
Aargau v. Zurich, Entscheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts aus dem' Jahre
1878, noted by Schindler, The Administration of Justice in the Swiss Federal Court
in Intercantonal Disputes, 15 At. J. INT'L L. 149, 169-72 (1921). See also cases cited
in Austin, A Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37 CAN. B.
RE'. 393, 433-34 (1959).
For supporting treaties, see, e.g., Franco-Hispanic Treaty of 1866, arts. IX, X, 56
BRIT.ST.P. 212, 226 (1866); Treaty with Mexico Respecting Utilization of Waters of
the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, art. 8, 59 Stat.
1219, T.S. No. 994 (Nov. 8, 1945); Treaty with Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters Between the United States and Canada, art. VIII, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548
(jan. 11, 1909); Agreement between France and Turkey relftive to Cilicia, art. XII,
114 BRIT.ST.P. 771 (1921); Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern
art. 6, Brit. T.S. No. 28 (1923); Convention of 1923 Relating to the Development of
Hydraulic Power Affecting More Than One State, Dec. 9, 1923, art. 2, 36 L.N.T.S. 76,
81; Franco-Turkish Protocol of 1930, translated by Hirsch, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 81, 86
(1956) from the Rapport a ]a Socift6 des Nations stir ]a situation de la Syrie et du
Liban 177 (1930).
" "[Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
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a primary interest which riparian states may reliably employ to
predict the probable result of a dispute submitted to a netural tribunal. It will, for instance, clearly subordinate the claims of absolute
sovereignty, prior consent, sovereign integrity, and pre-existing use
to the paramount concern of developing the river basin as a unit.
Moreover, equitable apportionment does not address itself to the
court's subjective and personal conscience, but to a weighing of
interests in a manner conforming to general practice and with an
end view of maximizing benefits of the river system as an integrated
whole. In precisely the same fashion, the Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the law of the fourteenth amendment after a
scrupulous review of the following considerations:
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the
manner in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available
alternatives to the procedure that was followed, the protection implicit
in the [state] whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and good accomplished-these are some of the considerations
that must enter into the judicial judgment."12
The application of due process standards is more than merely
an appeal to the conscience of the Court. Indeed, the Court has
frequently made clear that it does not fashion due process standards
from the Justices' private views of fairness, and that it is bound,
rather, to seek them in less personalized sources of law. Equally,
the principle of equitable apportionment may reasonably be regarded as an emerging law wholly susceptible of judicial application,
even though it too is not encapsuled in a verbal formula possessing
the ingratiating clarity of a simpler, more rigid principle.
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Procedural due process is assuredly a meaningful constitutional mainstay in the
United States. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has observed that "the history of liberty has
largely been the history of observance of procedural safeguards." McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943). Nor is it any less "lau" simply because the Court
"has always declined to give a comprehensive definition of it, and has preferred that
its full meaning should be gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of cases as they arise." Twining v. New Jersey.
211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908). The same can be said for the principle of equitable apportionment as an emerging rule of international law. For other judicial descriptions of
procedural due process, no more specific in their fashion than what we have said of
equitable apportionment, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) ("[procedures] implicit in the concept of ordered liberty..."); Herbert v. Louisiana, 272
U.S. 312, 316 (1926) ("fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all our civil and political institutions.")
112 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951).
See
also Karst, Legislative Facts in ConstitutionalLitigation, 1960 Sti'. CT. Rrv. 75.

Vol. 1964: 307]

INTERNATIONAL RIVER DISPUTES

339

To be specific, we can briefly look to the facts of Case IV and
suggest certain conclusions as to the adjudication of this dispute
under a principle of equitable apportionment. First, it is not consistent with maximum utilization of the Z River, treating the basin
as an integrated whole, to jeopardize X's plans in order to maintain
those canals in Y which are wasteful. As a minimum requirement,
Y should be held responsible for improving the canals to minimize
losses from absorption, evaporation and flooding. In the absence of
any showing that the water thus saved can more usefully be employed
or shared by 1', X may utilize that water in its hydroelectric projects
without taking costly measures to restore its flow into Y. Water
might also reasonably be withdrawn from the unfertile areas of Y
for use in the X facilities where it would be more economically employed, especially if X were to compensate Y for the meager loss of
benefits occasioned by the withdrawal.
If this proposed arrangement would still not provide enough
water for a substantial hydroelectric installation in X, an alternative
arrangement might be feasible: maximum use of the river can be
secured both for hydroelectric and irrigation uses if the rerouting
costs are shared. The costs, in accordance with equitable apportionment, should be allocated between the states according to their
relative abilities to pay and the relative benefits they will receive
from the river (including any arrangement X might make with Y
to share the power produced in X's dams), with due regard for the
efficient uses already existing in Y.
It is clear, of course, that a court cannot directly dictate the
particular terms of an agreement between X and Y. It can only
pass on the validity of one party's objection to the position that the
other party has taken. But in testing the position of each party
against the principle of equitable apportionment, the court clearly
influences negotiations by its anticipated decision on the validity
of the complaining state's objections. Before repairing to the
Court of Arbitration in the Lake Lanoux case, as we have previously
noted, the French coupled their proposed diversion with an offer to
replenish the lake from other sources, correctly anticipating the
favorable influence this offer would have with the Court of Arbitration in disposing of the subsequent Spanish complaint. In short,
mutual awareness of a prospective decision based on equitable apportionment may be expected to induce good faith negotiations so

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1964: 307

that each state may legitimately claim it has acted to encourage
development of the river basin as a whole.
The pressure for good faith negotiations is not exerted on the
proposing state alone, for should an objecting state not couple its
objection with any counter-offer to the proposing state's plan, it
stands in danger of being defeated in court under a decision holding
that the proposing state is entitled to proceed.
In this larger view, the first three principles of international law
we examined earlier are simply specific applications of equitable apportionment where the position taken by the prevailing state was
reasonable under the facts of each of those cases, i.e., it was conducive to maximizing the benefits of the river system with due regard
for the several considerations we have reviewed here. In Case IV,
neither state has presently advanced a proposal wholly consistent
with equitable apportionment, and thus neither could gain by
seeking an arbitral decision. Since the present use of the water is
clearly more satisfactory to Y than to X, one might expect that X
would alter its position during negotiations first, perhaps in the
direction indicated above, to share the costs of the rerouting system.
The burden of initiative does not necessarily fall always on the
proposing state, however, for it could just as easily be that X would
proceed with its project; then Y would be obliged to come forward
with a more reasonable proposal to complement its objection
to X's imminent diversion, in order to win an arbitral decision enjoining X's project.
It has not been the purpose of this article merely to catalogue
treaties or to review once again the myriad problems in establishing
a given proposition objectively as a rule of international law. It is
reasonably clear, however, that the parallel practices of states in
recent times, and the consensus of highly qualified publicists, support the unifying principle of equitable apportionment which has
been illustrated here. On balance, the principle enjoys sufficient
authoritative support, and is sufficiently coherent in its application
to disputes involving economic interests in international rivers to
render such controversies justiciable according to international law.

